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I. INTRODUCTION
The blurb in your program brochure asks, "Should the U.S. adopt a new
procedure for implementing adverse World Trade Organization (WTO)
decisions, possibly including an active role for U.S. courts?" In other words,
should WTO dispute settlement decisions be given some sort of official status
in the U.S. legal system? The topic is a timely one. There is a debate now
going on and likely to intensify soon about Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA)-a political arrangement designed to facilitate cooperation between the
two political branches of the Federal Government with authority in the field of
international economic relations. But in order to lead anywhere really
productive, the debate should step back a few paces and look more broadly at
our front-loaded system for achieving conformity with international obligations
undertaken in the trade field.
What do I mean by a front-loaded approach? The basic idea is that we
seek to make the changes necessary to implement new trade obligations all at
once, through an implementing bill enacted after a pact's signature and before
its entry into force. Thereafter, we worry mainly about complying with U.S.
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law as revised, rather than focusing directly on international obligations. This
is implicit in our TPA system-a system that aims to resolve a constitutional
conundrum-to enable us to participate as a credible partner in trade initiatives,
and to assign an appropriate implementing role to all three branches of
government. In the case of the judicial branch, the assigned role is basically
zero. We maintain a membrane between our legal system and the international
obligations, and we sideline judges by denying them any real role in policing
the government's conformity with international rules. They have to apply
domestic law in the cases that come before them, even if they think that
domestic law implements (transposes) international obligations incorrectly.
This situation strikes many lawyers, especially those from other jurisdic-
tions, as unsettling. And objectively speaking, the premise that we can do all
of our implementing up-front is starting to look more and more like a conceit.
According to one recent count published by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, there have been thirty three WTO dispute settlement cases
against the United States that succeeded on core issues, with U.S. measures
found to violate WTO obligations.1 The U.S. implementing legislation for the
WTO agreements, known as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), was
enacted in 1994 and took full effect along with the WTO agreements
themselves on January 1, 1995. Even subtracting cases involving measures put
in place after January 1, 1995, a few of which have been challenged at the
WTO, thirty-three losses means there were a lot of errors in the URAA-
mainly, a lot of measures we didn't think we needed to amend or repeal in
1994, but were later told we did. Such adverse rulings are hard to swallow,
since they reflect a stark difference of opinion (between the U.S. implementers
and the WTO adjudicators) over what the United States really agreed to. When
told that our implementers made dozens of serious errors, some of us suspect
that the problem may often lie with the adjudicators. The front-loaded
approach is also poorly-suited to ensuring conformity over time with certain
kinds of obligations, such as the obligation not to harm trading partners through
subsidization.
II. RESPONDING TO ADVERSE WTO DECISIONS-THE CURRENT SITUATION
Concerning the U.S. response when presented with adverse WTO dispute
settlement decisions, the situation at present is basically as follows:
1. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE U.S.
(2006), available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/
WTO/SectionIndex.html (follow "Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the United States" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 17, 2007).
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1) The Executive Branch, speaking for the United States, always
promptly declares an intention to bring measures found WTO
inconsistent into conformity, and normally requests a "reason-
able period of time" in which to do so. The Executive Branch
does not always have a clear sense of how the measures will be
revised to achieve conformity, or a clear plan for securing
Congressional approval where this is needed, but it always
announces an intention to comply. There were rumors that the
Internet Gambling case would break this pattern, and indeed it
might have if the Appellate Body had not modified the lower
panel findings and produced a final decision that could be
regarded as tolerable from a U.S. point of view.
2) Where the changes needed are within the power of the
Executive Branch to deliver, they are always delivered and
almost always on-time.
3) Where the changes needed require an Act of Congress, there are
sometimes substantial delays, and a few adverse decisions
requiring congressional action remain un-implemented to this
day (Examples: Havana Club, antidumping "all others" rate).
Congressional action can be obtained, even when political
resistance is strong, where meaningful retaliation by powerful
trading partners provides an added incentive (Examples:
FSC/ETI, Byrd Amendment). But generally, the Administration
is more interested in achieving WTO conformity than the
Congress is, and is asked to pay some sort of political price to
"buy" congressional action. Legislation implementing adverse
WTO decisions therefore is sometimes packaged with other
provisions, desired by Congress, which the administration
would not likely support in isolation. In one case (Irish Music),
the United States "monetized" a WTO conformity problem,
paying cash as a settlement to stem pressure from a victorious
complainant rather than altering a U.S. statute that would have
been politically hard to change. In another case that was
originally thought to require congressional action (Internet
Gambling), the Administration cited changes in its internal
"enforcement posture", which it said were adequate to achieve
conformity with the adopted WTO decision. The complainant
(Antigua) disagreed and requested compliance proceedings,
which resulted in a finding that the United States has not yet
achieved WTO-conformity in this matter.
In sum, we have a fairly ponderous mechanism for acting in the wake of
an adverse WTO decision, and a pretty skeptical attitude toward the whole
endeavor. We certainly could, in theory, streamline things.
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I1. WHAT ABOUT A CHANGE?
So what are the best reasons for and against a change that would "pierce
the membrane," give WTO obligations a higher status in the U.S. legal system,
and (presumably) allow judges to get into the game of policing the govern-
ment's behavior? Reasons for such a change include the following:
1) The nature of WTO obligations is changing, and in a way that
will put ever more pressure on our front-loaded implementing
system. Increasingly, the WTO rules include not just negative
obligations ("I will refrain from doing X to interfere with trade
if you will refrain from doing Y to interfere with trade") but
positive obligations as well ("I will do X to facilitate trade if
you will do Y to facilitate trade"). And they are becoming more
results-oriented rather than process-oriented ("I will undertake
to provide a competitive internal market for basic tele-
communications services"). What is needed to implement, and
ensure conformity over time, with obligations of this type
cannot easily be determined during the brief window between
signature and entry into force.
2) Judges, based on the trend of their opinions citing the
"Charming Betsy" doctrine, seem eager to get into this game,
and many of them would be capable of interpreting the WTO
agreements and judging government actions against those
agreements' requirements in close cases.
3) America's popularity in the world is at a low ebb in part because
of the perception that we are not much interested in being bound
by international rules. There is very little scope at present for
changing this perception in matters military (UN authorization
to use force; International Criminal Court), environmental
(Kyoto), or labor-related (ILO Conventions). Perhaps in the
economic sphere, where we are doing well and have a basis for
acting confidently, we could make a greater allowance and
effect a change that would have not just practical but also broad
symbolic importance.
Reasons against making such a major change include:
1) In debates over trade, we have always had a certain amount of
trouble with the "black helicopter" crowd-those who argue
that trade pacts, especially when coupled with membership in an
institution like the WTO, undermine our sovereignty. Up to
now, the WTO's defenders have always been able to prevail in
that argument, by pointing out that the WTO cannot directly
change U.S. legal and policy outcomes. We can be found in
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breach of WTO rules, but the decision about what to do in that
scenario is a political one. Without that layer of political
review, those dissenting on sovereignty grounds would have a
much more legitimate (and strongly felt) objection. Indeed, for
all its "voluntary" aspects, WTO dispute settlement is already
considered one of the most binding and effective forms of
international dispute settlement.
2) The WTO rules have edged (some would say sprawled) into a
number of areas that are sensitive, and in which a further
transfer of sovereignty would be troublesome. Included-to
cite just four that have caused problems for the United States
already-are such matters as gambling regulation, product
standards, government spending programs, and tax policy, as
well as various areas of service sector regulation traditionally
dominated by state and local authorities in the United States
rather than the federal government. Digesting this broader set
of obligations, not to mention finding consensus for still greater
expansions of the WTO's remit (now under discussion), will be
easier if we maintain political control in the dispute settlement
context.
3) The WTO dispute settlement process has produced a substantial
number of dubious pro-complainant decisions. Complainants
almost always succeed at least on large portions of their cases,
and there is a structural concern in that the decision-makers (and
the Secretariat officials who staff them) as individuals are
deeply invested in the WTO and want it to have the widest
footprint possible; they are generally willing to strain to find a
WTO rule that applies to conduct they find distasteful. Giving
the output of such a system, an official status in U.S. law would
be controversial, and rightly so.
4) Getting judges into the business of policing the government's
compliance with international rules would present difficult
challenges in our constitutional system. There are significant
foreign policy implications that cut in favor of a mainly
political, rather than legal, approach here. Indeed, there is a
broader principle in U.S. law, not limited to the trade field,
under which the task of determining what the international
obligations of the United States are rests in the first instance with
the Executive Branch. Allowing lawsuits against the government
to challenge assertedly WTO-inconsistent behavior would put
judges in the position of second-guessing--or possibly even
jumping ahead of-Executive Branch determinations.
I come down on the side of continuing to deny WTO dispute settlement
decisions formal recognition in U.S. law. It might make sense to temper the
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extreme "frontloadedness" of our TPA implementing system, and there may be
different ways to structure the political review that occurs in the wake of an
adverse WTO decision, but some layer of political review remains essential.
This fundamental aspect of the current U.S. approach would be too difficult and
risky to change.
But others will no doubt weigh the factors listed above differently, or
focus on other factors altogether, and reach a different conclusion. I hope the
debate is a vigorous one both during our Q&A this morning and in the forth-
coming discussions over renewing TPA. I thank you for your attention and
look forward to your comments and questions.
